Abstract-
2007, Shi et al. 2010 , Yang et al. 2011 . More recently, the vulnerabilities analysis of CPS to attacks triggered through unreliable communication networks has received increasing attention (Cardenas et al. 2008) . Attacks to NCS are summarized as follows: Denial of Service (DoS) attacks (Amin et al. 2009 ) when the adversary prevents the controller from received sensor measurement or the plant from received control law, deception attacks (Liu et al. 2009 , Teixeira et al. 2010 , Pasqualetti et al. 2012 when the adversary sends false information on sensors or actuators, replay attacks (Mo and Sinopoli 2010) , when the adversary generates artificial measurement delays, covert attacks (Smith 2011) when the adversary takes the control of the plant, and finally direct physical attacks on the plant (including sensors and actuators) closes to traditional faults taken into account by Fault Detection and Isolation (FDI) techniques (Chen and Patton 1996 and references therein) . This paper assumes that an attacker located inside the network of the NCS can add false data on the control signal transmitted by the controller to the plant. Our goal is to solve the state filtering problem of NCS subject to mixed deception attack and random packet dropouts. When the corrupted control signal is received by the plant, the Unknown Inputs Kalman Filter (UIKF) (Kitanidis 1987 , Chen and Patton 1996 , Darouach and Zasadzinski 1997 , Hou and Patton 1998 should be used to jointly estimate the state of the system and the exogenous unknown input (attacks are modeled as unknown inputs in a great number of papers, see Pasqualetti et al. 2012 and references therein). When the corrupted control signal is blocked to its previous value at the occurrence times of data losses, the unknown input is transformed to a constant bias at the input of the plant. Even if the Augmented State Kalman Filter (ASKF) (Alouani et al. 1992 , Kim et al. 2006 , Ignagni 2000 
Problem statement
We assume
The plant is controlled in the following NCS: From the following blocking logic
we consider that actuators use the past value of the control signal when * k u is lost. The study of * k u is not the purpose of this paper.
We assume that the attacker can corrupt the control signal received by the plant as 
where k u in (2.6) is known to the controller having access to the binary sequence { } 
By rewriting the hybrid disturbance (2.7) as a constant bias
we can derive the following 
Switching disturbance reconstruction
The implementation of the ) q n ( + -order ASIIKF is explained in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1: The ASIIKF is described by a standard Kalman filter
The ASIIKF is initialized with From (2.10), (3.1) and (3.3), the state prediction
Proof. Consider the following linear state filter
and the state estimation error From (3.11) and (3.12), we have 
leading to the ASIIKF of theorem 3.1 after some manipulations (Keller and Sauter 2012) .
End of proof
Note that data losses have a benefic filtering effect on the estimate
, the algebraic constraint (3.13) disappearing when
The Riccati Difference Equation (RDE) of the ASIIKF is described by
with k K given by (3.14). Define the following Riccati
. As shown by Keller and Sauter (2013) , the ASIIKF's RDE (3.15) can take the form of a switching standard RDE λ the critical data arrival rate (Sinopoli et al. 2004) so that 
Theorem 3.2: We have
The lower bound λ ⌣ of c λ is solution to the LMI (Linear Matrix Inequality) feasibility problem
we have also
Proof. From (3.18) , the mean covariance { }
The Riccati operators (3.16) and (3.17) are concave, increase with X and the Jensen's inequality gives
the modified ARDE associated to (3.25). Sinopoli et al. (2004) 
or equivalently if there exists K , K and
given by (3.20). We have also
is generated by the ASIIKF's RDE (3.18) under Darouach and Zasadzinski (1997) have shown that
under the necessary and sufficient rank condition (3.21).
End of proof
When q m= , we have 
Numerical example
Considers the NCS of figure 1 
Conclusion
This paper has presented a state filtering for linear 
